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I. INTRODUCTION
If one were to consider the intermediate-level scrutiny given com-
mercial speech as a straight line, the Supreme Court has barely been able
to walk it without tripping over its precedents during the past fifteen years.
The Court's paper trail at best indicates an inconsistent application of the
relevant standard; since the Court adopted the Central Hudson' test in
1980, its decisions have been anything but predictable. In its 1996 Term,
the Court had an opportunity to steady itself and discard Central Hudson
in favor of an absolute, less-manipulable test, similar to that used for non-
commercial speech: content-based regulations on commercial speech must
pass strict scrutiny muster. Unfortunately, in 44 Liquonnart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island,2 while the Court unanimously supported First Amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech, no majority emerged to lead the Court from its
shakiness.
The current commercial speech doctrine is of recent origin. Political
speech and speech relating to individual ideas or beliefs come under the
protective wing of the First Amendment in most instances. This "core"
speech is fully protected by the Constitution, and although the Court re-
views government regulation of core speech through a strict scrutiny
analysis, this review has been coined "strict in theory and fatal in fact" be-
cause the government regulation seldom survives.3 Other types of speech
are "categorized," resulting in lower levels of scrutiny. Some speech cate-
gories, like obscenity, receive no protection. Others, like indecent speech
and commercial speech, receive some protection, but not the full force of
the First Amendment.
There are several reasons intermediate scrutiny is inappropriate to
commercial speech. Doctrinally, commercial speech is in isolation. While
the Court generally strikes down content-based restrictions directed at spe-
cific messages, the commercial speech doctrine allows just that. Also, the
Central Hudson test is too complicated and manipulable to provide any
certainty of protection. The test focuses on the final two prongs, a reason-
ableness prong and a limitation prong, both subjective in the eyes of any
court. Finally, as society becomes more commercialized, the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial becomes obscure. Today's po-
litical statement is tomorrow's Web-page endorsement. The nature of
1. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
2. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
3. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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speech is one of multiple meanings, and it would be contrary to the intent
of the First Amendment to reduce speech to its lowest common denomi-
nator.
The 44 Liquormart case offered the Court a perfect opportunity to re-
vise its doctrine. The conflict involved pure commercial speech of an ac-
tivity not protected by the Constitution, which eliminated one distinguish-
ing feature of the commercial speech doctrine. The regulation totally
banned certain speech, which offered the Court more leeway than past
cases involving only partial bans. Finally, the state's purpose was poorly
supported by the evidence presented at the district court, and instead relied
mainly on unsupported beliefs relating advertising and consumption.
While 44 Liquonnart provided the Court an easy analysis under Central
Hudson, the Court's decision leaves open the doors on the periphery, doors
of which the Court had knowledge and precedential force to close. The
commercial speech doctrine remains on the line, having failed to reach
strict scrutiny solidity.
This Comment discusses the history of the commercial speech doc-
trine and the Court's decision in 44 Liquormart. It analyzes the Court's
approaches in this case and suggests alternatives the Supreme Court should
and could have applied.4 This Comment then concludes by discussing the
decision's effect on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) in the broadcast media.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. The Early Doctrine
The Court first considered its commercial speech doctrine in Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen.5 Chrestensen had purchased a submarine and at-
tempted to capitalize on the public interest in the war effort by docking the
sub at Battery Park in New York City. He then distributed a handbill ad-
vertising this attraction. City officials prevented Chrestensen from re-
maining in Battery Park and also informed him of a city ordinance prohib-
iting the distribution of commercial handbills in public places. The
ordinance did permit individuals to distribute leaflets as a form of public
4. For purposes of this Comment, commercial speech is truthful and nonmisleading,
and concerns lawful activity. Therefore, tobacco advertising restrictions will not be dis-
cussed in detail, as the Federal Trade Commission regulates this field under its jurisdiction
for inherently dangerous products. This Comment also does not discuss the related question
of what constitutes commercial speech. On this issue, see Rodney A. Smolla, Information,
Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial
Speech, 71 Tax. L. REv. 777 (1993).
5. Valentine, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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protest. Chrestensen, after relocating his submarine, distributed a new,
double-sided handbill advertising the submarine on one side and protesting
the official's denial of permission to dock it at Battery Park.6 Chrestensen
was convicted of violating the city ordinance. The Court reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit and rejected Chrestensen's First Amendment argument. Justice
Roberts, in his majority opinion, simply stated: "We are equally clear that
the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.
' 7
The Court must have developed this clarity only several weeks after
its decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.8 In Chaplinsky, the Court
was "certain" that there were "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem."9 The Court only mentioned "the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace."' The exclusion of commercial speech
in this list is important in that it characterizes the Court's view, or rather its
overlook, of typical First Amendment speech; commercial speech was not
even considered "speech" before the Court had reason to consider the
question.
More than thirty years later, the Court brought commercial speech
back under the protective wing of the First Amendment, but distinguished
the value of commercial speech from that of core political speech. In Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.," the Court reviewed a situation in which the state had banned phar-
macies from advertising prices of prescription drugs to consumers, based
on an interest in upholding the professionalism of licensed pharmacists.
The Court held that this interest did not outweigh the consumer interest in
the "free flow of commercial information."'' 2 The Court noted that the
6. Id. at 52-53.
7. Id. at 54. The Court considered that Chrestensen's "political protest" on the alter-
nate side of the leaflet was merely an attempt to circumvent the city ordinance. Id. at 55.
8. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9. Id. at 571-72.
10. Id. at 572.
11. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). This case followed on
the heels of the Court's decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), in which the
Court struck down an advertising ban on out-of-state abortions. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council broadened this holding by extending First Amendment protection to activities
which are not constitutionally protected. Bigelow has since been reaffirmed in Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod-
ucts Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
12. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 763.
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"consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information... may
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate."' 3 However, Justice Blackmun indicated that commercial
speech would receive "a different degree of protection... to insure that
the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unim-
paired."'4 He noted that commercial speech differed in two ways from
noncommercial speech: first, that commercial speech is more "objective"
than other types of speech, in that the speaker is more likely to know "the
truth" about the subject of the speech than anyone else; and second, that
commercial speech is "more durable," since economic incentives make it
more likely to find a way into the information marketplace. 5 Despite these
differences, the Court's new approach toward c6mmercial speech was
dramatically different than that under Valentine.
B. The New Commercial Speech Doctrine: Central Hudson
The Court "quantified" the commercial speech doctrine in Central
Hudson.6 At issue in Central Hudson was the New York Commission's
total prohibition on promotional advertising placed upon a utility com-
pany. The Commission wanted to prevent advertising which urged con-
sumers not to conserve energy. The Court established a four-part test to
determine the validity of a regulation restricting commercial speech. First,
the commercial speech must be truthful and not misleading. Second, the
government must have a substantial interest in regulating the commercial
speech. Third, the restriction must directly advance the government's as-
serted interest. Finally, the restriction should be no more extensive than
necessary to achieve the interest.
7
The Court found that while the state had a substantial interest in con-
serving resources, and that restricting advertising would advance that in-
terest, the total prohibition the Commission placed on Central Hudson was
more extensive than necessary. The prohibition would prevent Central
Hudson from promoting products that would increase consumer efficiency
or alternative products that would not increase inefficiency. The Commis-
sion had not demonstrated that alternatives to a total prohibition would be
ineffective.'8
While the case was a victory for the speech interest, the concurring
13. Id.
14. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
15. Id.
16. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
17. Id. at 566.
18. Id. at 570.
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opinions by Blackmun and Stevens expressed concern that the test would
allow too much regulation of truthful advertising. Both Justices argued that
the state could not proscribe such communication without a clear and pres-
ent danger that unlawful activity would occur. They stressed that legisla-
tures should regulate activities, not the speech regarding those activities.' 9
The Court, in the commercial speech cases following Central Hud-
son, did not live up to the expectations many had of the intermediate scru-
tiny afforded in Central Hudson. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Di-
ego,2 the Court struck down an ordinance restricting billboards containing
commercial and noncommercial speech. The plurality and dissent clearly
indicated, however, that an ordinance banning commercial billboards
would be constitutional. The problem in Metromedia was that too much
noncommercial speech was also restricted. Applying the Central Hudson
test, the Court found that the ban, applied to commercial advertising, met
the first, second, and fourth prongs of the test. The major question the
Court had was whether the ban "materially advanced" the alleged govern-
mental interests in aesthetics and traffic safety. In agreeing that the ban
also passed this prong of the test, the Court applied only a deferential
analysis.2 This deference would continue to resurface in future applica-
tions of the Central Hudson test.
The commercial speech interest fared no better in the Court's next
application of Central Hudson. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,2' Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion holding that a ban on advertising casinos to residents did not un-
constitutionally infringe on the First Amendment. The Court deferred
heavily to the legislative determination that excess gambling would be det-
rimental to the residents' health, safety, and welfare, and the legislative
determination that banning advertising would reduce those harms.24 The
19. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring, Brennan, J., joining); Id. at 579 (Stevens, J.,
concurring, Brennan, J., joining). Justice Rehnquist dissented, as he did in Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, arguing that commercial speech was undeserving of extensive First
Amendment protection; he believed that the four-prong test elevated commercial speech to
the same level of protection as core political speech. He also believed that the test returned
judicial analysis to the Lochner era. Id. at 589. Commentators suggest that Rehnquist's later
adoption of the Central Hudson test allowed him to undermine much protection of com-
mercial speech. See Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and
Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1931, 1944-
58 (1992).
20. Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
21. Id. at512,553.
22. Id. at 508-12.
23. Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
24. Id. at 341.
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majority was similarly deferential in applying the fourth prong of the
test-that the regulation be no more extensive than necessary.' Perhaps
even more disturbing than the rational basis-type scrutiny was the Chief
Justice's enunciation of a broader limit on First Amendment protection for
commercial speech. He stated:
[Tihe greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily in-
cludes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling .... It
would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners.., to gain recog-
nition of a First Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the resi-
dents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the legislature into banning
casino gambling by residents altogether. It would just as surely be a
strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature
the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legis-
lature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product
or activity ... 26
While the greater-includes-the-lesser argument has found its way into
subsequent opinions, the Court has only recited it after going through the
motions of the Central Hudson test.
The Court continued its deferential analysis in Board of Trustees of
State University of New York v. Fox.7' Here, the Court upheld a univer-
sity's ban of commercial speech occurring on campus. The challengers to
this ban had attempted to sell Tupperware-like goods to students living in
the campus dormitories. After concluding that the speech in question satis-
fied the first prong and that the state had a substantial interest in promoting
education, protecting student security, and preventing commercial exploi-
tation, the case turned on the fit between the means and the interest under
the fourth prong of the test. Justice Scalia indicated that this fit does not
have to meet a least-restrictive-means standard, but rather it only needs to
be reasonable and narrowly tailored to meet the state's objective.2
The Court rejuvenated its Central Hudson analysis in City of Cincin-
nati v. Discovery Network, Inc.29 The Court struck down a city ordinance
25. Id. at 343.
26. Id. at 345-46. Taken literally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach would allow
states to ban all commercial speech for all products not constitutionally protected, since
Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944), and Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483 (1955), hold that the Court will defer to the legislature in economic matters.
Of course, Rehnquist disregards an important point; although almost any product could be
banned by legislatures if they are not protected, commercial speech about these products is
protected by the First Amendment. The only thing "strange" about such a doctrine is that
Rehnquist did not admit that it would be constitutionally correct. See also Posadas, 478
U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
28. Id. at 479-8 1.
29. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
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which barred public property newsracks containing commercial handbills
but not newsracks containing ordinary newspapers. Cincinnati claimed that
it had a legitimate interest in decreasing sidewalk impediments and the un-
attractiveness associated with newsracks. It also feared that a total ban
would be unconstitutional, and therefore limited the ban to the lesser-
protected commercial speech. ° Justice Stevens, writing for a six-to-three
majority, rejected the discrimination against commercial speech. Applying
the last two prongs of the Central Hudson test, the majority found that the
"fit" between the city's interests and the regulation were not close.3' In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated: "The benefit to be derived from
the removal of 62 newsracks while about 1,500-2,000 remain in place was
considered 'minute' by the District Court and 'paltry' by the Court of Ap-
peals. We share their evaluation of the 'fit' between the city's goal and its
method of achieving it. '32 The Court rejected the city's argument that the
ordinance was a content-neutral restriction advancing the city's interests in
safety and aesthetics, because "the very basis for the regulation is the dif-
ference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech.,
33
This stricter application of Central Hudson continued in Edenfield v.
Fane.34 In Edenfield, the Court struck down a Florida ban on in-person so-
licitations by certified public accountants. Florida asserted that it had a
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from fraud and protecting the
standards of the accounting profession. The eight-to-one majority did not
believe the ban advanced the state's interests "in any direct and material
way. '3 The state could not produce any empirical evidence that indicated
the link between the state's interests and its regulation.
30. Id. at 415. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority decision
placed municipalities across the country in a double bind. He stated:
One would have thought that the city, perhaps even following the teachings of our
commercial speech jurisprudence, could have decided to place the burden of its
regulatory scheme on less protected speech (i.e. commercial handbills) without
running afoul of the First Amendment. Today's decision, though, places the city
in the position of having to decide between restricting more speech-fully pro-
tected speech-and allowing the proliferation of newsracks on its street comers to
continue unabated. It scarcely seems logical that the First Amendment compels
such a result .... [Llittle can be gained in the area of constitutional law, and
much lost in the process of democratic decisionmaking, by allowing individual
judges in city after city to second-guess.., legislative.., determinations" on
such matters of esthetics.
Id. at 445 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 570 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
31. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417.
32. Id. at 417-18.
33. Id. at 429.
34. Edenfield, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
35. Id. at 771.
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Only two months later, the Court reviewed a federal ban on lottery
advertisements in nonlottery states and returned to a more Posadas-type
interpretation of the Central Hudson test. In United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co.,36 the seven-to-one majority concluded that the federal regula-
tion of a "vice" such as gambling satisfied the Central Hudson require-
ments. After referring to the greater-includes-the-lesser argument of
Posadas,37 the Court granted deference to Congress in its analysis of the
third prong of Central Hudson. Applying the fourth prong of the test, the
Court determined that Congress's solution was reasonable. The majority
rejected Appellant Edge's argument that the statute was ineffective be-
cause the North Carolina residents still received Virginia lottery adver-
tisements from other sources.38
Nearly two years later, the Court rejected the "vice" argument in al-
lowing regulation of commercial speech. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,39
the Court ruled that a federal regulation on beer labels did not meet Cen-
tral Hudson scrutiny. A unanimous Court ruled that the regulation did not
directly and materially advance the government's interest.40 In fact, beer
manufacturers could circumvent the regulation merely by using descriptive
terms to indicate alcohol content, rather than numerical terms. 41 The Court
indicated that even if the government established the "direct advancement"
prong, the regulation was not "sufficiently tailored to its goal. 42 Other op-
tions existed which would not infringe as much on the commercial speech
interest.
The Court's most recent application of Central Hudson was its deci-
sion in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. . involving lawyer solicitation.
The Court, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice O'Connor, upheld
the regulation. After agreeing that the Florida Bar's interest in protecting
accident victims' privacy was substantial, the majority considered whether
a thirty-day ban on direct solicitation advanced this interest in a direct
manner. Unlike the case in Edenfield, the majority found that the 106 page
study of lawyer solicitation sufficiently established the invasions of pri-
vacy the Florida Bar sought to regulate. The Court also found that because
the Bar's interests were individual privacy and the upholding of the legal
profession, the public could not avoid the harm merely by "'averting their
36. Edge, 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
37. Id. at 426.
38. Id. at 432-33.
39. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
40. Id. at 488.
41. Id. at 488-89.
42. Id. at 490.
43. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
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eyes.' '4 The majority then moved on to the fourth prong of Central Hud-
son and gave deference to the State Bar's determinations. The dissent ar-
gued that even if the Bar's interests were substantial, the ban did not assert
the interest in "a direct and material way."45 Additionally, the dissent ar-
gued that the study was "noteworthy for its incompetence" and was not
sufficient to show "the reality of the asserted harm., 46 Nor did the dissent
believe that the ban met the fourth prong of Central Hudson.
1H. 44 LIQUORMART, INC. V. RHODE ISLAND
Petitioner 44 Liquormart, Inc. was a Rhode Island corporation and a
licensed retail alcohol dealer.47 In December 1991, 44 Liquormart placed
an advertisement in the Providence Journal-Bulletin entitled
"Thanksgiving Harvest." The ad included the names and prices of various
snacks, nonalcoholic drinks, and cigarettes. In addition, the ad displayed
bottles of several brands of liquor; by these, the word "WOW!" appeared
in a "burst form." 4
On December 17, 1991, Kate F. Racine, the Liquor Control Admin-
istrator, initiated a hearing to determine whether 44 Liquormart had vio-
lated Rhode Island General Laws section 3-8-7, which proscribes the off-
premises advertising of alcoholic beverage prices. This has been inter-
preted to include descriptive terms such as "wow., 4 9 Section 3-8-7 does not
proscribe in-store displays or price tags. ° Racine found that 44 Liquormart
44. Id. at 630 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971))).
45. Id. at 640 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
46. Id.
47. 44 Liquormart, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994), rev'g 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829
F. Supp. 543 (D.R.I. 1993), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
48. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.R.I. 1993).
49. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-7 (1994).
50. Id. The section provides:
No manufacturer, wholesaler, or shipper from without this state and no holder of
a license issued under the provisions of this title and chapter shall cause or permit
the advertising in any manner whatsoever of the price of any malt beverage, cor-
dials, wine or distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however, that
the provisions of this section shall not apply to price signs or tags attached to or
placed on merchandise for sale within the licensed premises in accordance with
rules and regulations of the department.
Id. In addition, "[r]egulation 32 of the Rules and Regulations of the Liquor Control Ad-
ministrator was enacted to 'enforce' the provisions of § 3-8-7." 44 Liquor Mart, 829 F.
Supp. at 544 n.3. Regulation 32 proscribes placards and signs which make "reference to the
price" of alcoholic beverages and which are visible from the exterior of a liquor store. Liq-
uor Control Admin. Reg. 32; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-8.1 (1994) (proscribing news-
papers from printing advertisements which make "reference to the price of any alcoholic
beverage").
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had violated section 3-8-7 by placing the ad, and fined the store four hun-
dred dollars.
Instead of appealing the decision through administrative channels
51
44 Liquormart filed suit in federal district court, alleging that section 3-8-7
and related laws unconstitutionally restricted its First Amendment rights.
The district court found in favor of 44 Liquormart, but the First Circuit re-
versed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of
whether Rhode Island may, in accordance with the First Amendment,
"prohibit truthful, non-misleading price advertising regarding alcoholic
beverages. 53
Justice Stevens delivered an eight-part opinion, which garnered the
majority for Parts I, II, VII, and VIII. Unfortunately, the real substance of
Justice Stevens's opinion was in Parts M-VI, and this opinion was joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy, Souter (for Parts IlI and V), and Tho-
mas (for Part VI). 4 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, and her
opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice
Breyer. Justices Thomas and Scalia also had separate concurrences.
5
A. The Court's Decisions
Both parties stipulated that price advertising is truthful and nonmis-
leading. The parties further agreed that Rhode Island has a significant in-
terest in "regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages."5 This case would
then seemingly have turned on the application of the third and fourth
prongs of the Central Hudson test, and a unanimous Court found that the
Rhode Island regulation unconstitutionally infringed petitioner's First
Amendment rights. However, Justices Stevens and O'Connor came to that
result from two distinct approaches.
1. Justice Stevens's Opinion
Justice Stevens began Part IV of his opinion by differentiating be-
tween a complete ban on the dissemination of truthful information and a
51. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-3-5 (1994) (allowing parties to appeal the Liquor Control
Administrator's decision to the Liquor Control Hearing Board).
52. 44 Liquonnart, 39 F.3d 5.
53. 44 Liquormart, 514 U.S. 1095 (1995). Although petitioner People's Super Liquor
Stores, Inc. had additionally argued in district court that § 3-8-8.1 also violated the Com-
merce Clause, it focused solely on the First Amendment argument during the appeal. The
First Circuit considered the argument waived. 44 Liquormart, 39 F.3d at 9.
54. 44 Liquornart, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1501 (1996).
55. Id.
56. 44 Liquonnart, 39 F.3d at 6-7.
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partial ban on such information.57 Rather than starting his analysis with
Central Hudson, Stevens described the Court's earlier decisions on com-
mercial speech, stating that cases like Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy had
rejected broad-based bans on advertisements.58 He noted that the Court had
always looked upon complete bans with more scrutiny, and concluded that
"when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of [commercial speech],
there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands."59
Even in Central Hudson, Stevens noted that the Court had acknowl-
edged "special concerns" for "'regulations that entirely suppress commer-
cial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. ' ° Stevens also
articulated a more stringent standard of review for when the state purpose
is not related to preserving the fair bargaining process, but instead is based
on a belief that the public consumer will act "'irrationally' to the truth.'
Stevens asserted that with these two conditions met-a complete ban
and a purpose not related to consumer protection-Central Hudson re-
quires, and has always required, the Court to view this kind of state regu-
lation with "'special care."' 62 At least for complete bans on truthful com-
mercial speech, Stevens's "special concern" prompted using an analysis
heightened above Central Hudson; Stevens would apply a standard akin to
strict scrutiny, and as such, the regulation fails.
However, possibly sensing that the rest of the Court was not willing
to go so far, Stevens also applied Central Hudson to the Rhode Island ban
and found that the ban failed to meet the third and fourth prongs of the
test.63 First, while Stevens gave deference to the state's position that a ban
would tend to reduce alcohol consumption, he found that the ban did not
advance this interest "'to a material degree." '64 Stevens regarded the con-
57. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507.
58. Id. at 1505-07. At the same time, Stevens differentiated commercial speech con-
cerning illegal activity, which the First Amendment does not protect. Id. at 1505 n.7 (citing
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)).
59. Id. at 1507.
60. Id. at 1506 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
61. Id. at 1507-08 (quoting Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)).
Linmark involved a ban against "For Sale" signs, which the Court found unconstitutional
because it proscribed too many opportunities for communication. The city's purpose in cre-
ating the ban was to prevent "white flight" from a neighborhood increasingly populated by
minorities.
62. Id. at 1508 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 477 U.S. at 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
63. Id. at 1508-10.
64. Id. at 1509 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
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nection between the asserted interest of "temperance" and the ban
"speculative."' He also found that the state failed to satisfy the fourth
prong, because other nonspeech options existed that would have achieved
the state's goal."
While Stevens and several other Justices seemed willing to apply
strict scrutiny to regulations on truthful advertising, a majority seemed
content to continue down the path Central Hudson created. The strongest
reading drawn from 44 Liquormart may be that as to complete bans on
commercial speech, the Court will strictly apply Central Hudson so that in
those cases, the analysis resembles strict scrutiny.
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Souter and Breyer, concurred in declaring the Rhode Island statute uncon-
stitutional. Unlike Stevens's position, the concurrence was content to apply
Central Hudson; their application here was arguably more strict than the
Court's application in previous cases. O'Connor focused only on the fourth
prong of Central Hudson, ignoring the materiality aspect of the case.
O'Connor began by citing the Court's opinions in Fox and Went For
It to indicate that the requisite fit under the fourth prong is that which is
"reasonable."67 In those cases, however, the First Amendment interest was
outweighed by the government interest in regulating the commercial
speech. Nevertheless, O'Connor stated that "[t]he fit between Rhode Is-
land's method and this particular goal is not reasonable."68 Is it really, if
the Court is following Fox and Went For It? Is the Rhode Island legisla-
ture's belief that increasing search times, and hence the cost for alcohol, by
not allowing price advertising that unreasonable against this backdrop? As
a reminder, the Court in Fox found that prohibiting commercial speech
reasonably fit with the Board's goal of preventing naive college students
from buying inordinate amounts of Tupperware. Although O'Connor uses
the word, the standard is something more than "reasonable."
The concurrence makes this clear by stepping into the shoes of a leg-
islative body and declaring: "If the target is simply higher prices generally
to discourage consumption, the regulation imposes too great, and unneces-
sary, a prohibition on speech in order to achieve it. The state has other
65. Id. at 1510.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) and Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
632-33 (1995)).
68. Id. at 1521.
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methods at its disposal .... [Including] 'establishing minimum prices
and/or by increasing sales taxes on alcoholic beverages." ' '69 Rhode Island
argued that Posadas supported the Court's acquiescence in cases involving
the state's regulation of commercial speech of a "vice" activity, of which
alcohol sales are, and when the prohibition on speech was designed to
protect state residents. ° O'Connor noted that the Court, subsequent to
Posadas, has considered such regulations on speech with a "closer look" to
ensure that the statute directly advances the state's interest (the third prong
of Central Hudson) and is narrowly tailored.71
While the concurrence undoubtedly reached the correct result, its dis-
cussion of its reasoning is indicative that Central Hudson should be dis-
carded. Justice Thomas, in his separate concurrence, wrote that "the
Court's holding will in fact be quite sweeping if applied consistently in
future cases. 'T But this is precisely the point: the Court does not, has not,
and most likely will not apply Central Hudson consistently.
3. Posadas and the Greater-Includes-the-Lesser Argument
In Posadas, the majority concluded that the greater power to com-
pletely ban casino gambling necessarily included the lesser power to pro-
hibit advertising the activity. 73 Rhode Island adopted this analysis here and
argued that because it could ban the sale of alcohol altogether, it could also
regulate price advertising. Stevens, joined by three Justices, rejected the
analogy and the entire Posadas deferential approach. Stevens discounted
the greater-includes-the-lesser "syllogism" as one mentioned in majority
opinions when an alternate doctrinal theory explains the outcome.74
Stevens distinguished regulation of sales of goods and regulation of
the information surrounding those goods, stating that this distinction was
clearly "incompatible with the absolutist view" of the state's power to ban
commercial speech due to its power to regulate conduct.75 Although Ste-
vens did not carry a majority, his strong language against the Posadas
69. Id. at 1521-22 (quoting 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d (1st Cir. 1994)
(quoting the State's expert witness)).
70. Id. at 1521 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328
(1986)). Note that Rhode Island's reasoning is initially in error, as its statute prevented
Rhode Island liquor retailers from advertising prices even in out-of-state media, contrary to
Posadas.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1519 (Thomas, J., concurring).
73. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
74. 44 Liquonnart, 116 S. Ct. at 1512; see also supra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text.
75. 44Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1512-13.
[Vol. 50
SOBRIETY TEST
logic will likely dissuade future attempts to base regulation on its faulty
logic.
Stevens also went on to discuss the "vice" argument Rhode Island
made in attempting to validate its regulation. The Court in Posadas and
Edge Broadcasting upheld commercial speech regulations involving
"vice" activities.76 However, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court
made it clear that similar to the greater-includes-the-lesser argument, the
vice "exception" to typical commercial speech doctrine was subject to the
regulation meeting the Central Hudson requirements; unless it did, there
was no "exception."' Together with Coors Brewing, 44 Liquormart clearly
supports no special treatment for regulations involving legal but "socially
harmful activities."
4. Consideration of the Twenty-First Amendment
Rhode Island also argued that its regulation was entitled to an addi-
tional presumption of validity based on the Twenty-First Amendment.78
Because the Twenty-First Amendment grants states the exclusive power to
regulate alcohol, Rhode Island believed that it also had the power to regu-
late the advertising of alcohol. It found support in Queensgate Investment
Co. v. Liquor Control Commissio7 9 and California v. LaRue. ° In Queens-
gate, the Court let stand an Ohio decision which found that the Twenty-
First Amendment supported the State's position under Central Hudson.
The Ohio Supreme Court applied this presumption to the state interest
prong of the test." The First Circuit applied Queensgate Investment in sup-
porting the regulation.82 The Court in LaRue upheld the regulation of nude
76. Posadas involved casino gambling, while Edge concerned a neighboring state's
lottery.
77. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. 476,482 n.2 (1995), cited in 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at
1512.
78. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1514. The amendment provides: "[t]he transportation
or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI, § 2.
79. Queensgate Inv., 433 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
80. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
81. Queensgate Inv., 433 N.E.2d at 141.
82. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1994), rev'g 44 Liquor
Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543 (D.R.I. 1993), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). The
Circuits have differed in applying Queensgate Investment. The Tenth Circuit, in Oklahoma
Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Capital Cities Cable Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984), found that the Twenty-First
Amendment gave states greater power to regulate liquor advertising. However, the Fifth
Circuit distinguished Queensgate Investment. Dunagin v. Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.
1983).
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dancing in bars licensed to serve alcohol. A majority held that the Twenty-
First Amendment added a presumption of validity to the regulation. Again,
the First Circuit adopted this reasoning in upholding the Rhode Island stat-
ute.
In reversing the First Circuit, the Court in 44 Liquormart reversed it-
self. The majority stated that while it did not question its holding in LaRue,
it no longer believed that the Twenty-First Amendment was necessary in
deciding that case.83 It found that the Twenty-First Amendment did not su-
persede other constitutional provisions such as the Supremacy Clause, the
Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. 4 Similarly, it now
does not supersede the Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment.
Despite its clarification on this point, some questions remain. Con-
sidering the recent tobacco litigation and the concern over tobacco adver-
tising, would the relation between the Commerce Clause and the First
Amendment undergo the same analysis? With the Court striking down this
type of paternalistic regulation of commercial speech, tobacco advertise-
ment regulation seems difficult to distinguish. Perhaps federal regulation
and the (possibly more dangerous) nature of tobacco would make the
Court react differently.
IV. ALTERNATE ANALYSES-AWAY FROM CENTRAL HUDSON
A. Categorical Approach: R.A.V. v. St. Paul5
While the Court has found First Amendment protection over a wide
range of "core" speech, it has also created categories of speech which re-
ceive less or no protection. Commercial speech is one such category. De-
spite the loss of First Amendment protection for these categories, the Court
has found unconstitutional content-based distinctions within such a cate-
gory. In R.A.V., the Court struck down a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance
which proscribed certain kinds of "hate speech." The Court was unani-
83. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1514. The Court distinguished the regulation in LaRue
as one concerning a type of speech in liquor establishments, not one involving speech con-
cerning alcohol. Id.
84. Id. at 1514-15.
85. R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
86. Application of the "clear and present danger" category perfected in United States v.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), was given some consideration, but given the Court's
abandonment of this doctrine and the difficulty in applying Brandenburg to commercial
speech, a detailed discussion would not aid the analysis here.
87. The ordinance was aimed at punishing racially, sexually, or religiously discrimi-
nating speech that "one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others." St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS.
CODE § 292.02.
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mous in its decision, but was bitterly divided on the reasoning. Justice
Scalia, writing for a five-member majority on the unconstitutionality of
content-based discrimination even for "unprotected" speech, explained
why "fighting words" received full First Amendment protection.
St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expres-
sion-it has not, for example, selected for prohibition only those
fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to
a merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting words
of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or
religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that
the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That
possibility would alone be enough to render the ordinance presump-
tively invalid, but St. Paul's comments and concessions in this case
.... 88
elevate the possibility to a certainty.
Justice Stevens, in his opinion concurring in the result, responded to
the ascension of "fighting words" to strict scrutiny. "Assuming that the
Court is correct that this ... class of speech is not wholly 'unprotected,' it
certainly does not follow that fighting words and obscenity receive the
same sort of protection afforded core political speech.... Perversely, this
gives fighting words greater protection than is afforded commercial
speech." '89
If a content-based restriction of categorically "unprotected" speech
fails under a strict scrutiny analysis, why would the Court give content-
based restrictions of commercial speech different treatment? The reason
was offered by Justice Scalia:
The content-based discrimination reflected in the St. Paul ordinance
comes within neither any of the specific exceptions to the First
Amendment prohibition... nor a more general exception for content
discrimination that does not threaten censorship of ideas. It assuredly
does not fall within the exception for content discrimination based on
the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue (here,
fighting words) is proscribeable .... [T]he reason why fighting words
are categorically excluded from... protection... is not that their
content communicates any particular idea, but that their content em-
bodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecesary) mode of
expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.
The Court did not create its "fighting words" doctrine to suppress the
content of a certain type of speech, but rather to affect the way in which it
is expressed, or in Scalia's language, the "mode of expression." Govern-
ment can proscribe face-to-face confrontations, but the state would have to
meet strict scrutiny to regulate the same expression in another forum
88. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393-94.
89. Id. at 422-23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 393 (Scalia, J.).
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where the risk of violence was not present. Unlike other types of speech,
however, commercial speech is regulated on the basis of content.9, States
regulate the advertisement of some activities but not others, because the
content of some activities is more prone to cause public harm. Because
content is one of the bases for regulating commercial speech, the Court
would not review such content-based restrictions under strict scrutiny.9
This reasoning loses much of its persuasiveness when one of the
main premises-the advertising causes public harms (typically fraudulent
or misleading advertisements)-is removed on a showing of the truth of
the commercial speech. If the risk of public harm which permits states to
proscribe certain commercial speech does not exist because the commer-
cial speech is truthful, the content-based reasons to regulate the speech are
eliminated. Further, the information value of commercial speech seem-
ingly outweighs the value of fighting words in both its utility to the indi-
vidual listener and the sheer number of listeners who are interested in the
communication. Truthful commercial speech should thus be reviewed un-
der the same strict scrutiny analysis given to content-based regulations of
categorically-excluded speech.
B. Strict Scrutiny Analysis Subject to Time, Place, and Manner
Restrictions
If the Court simply treated commercial speech as noncategorical,
then noncommercial, content-based regulations would have to pass strict
scrutiny muster. This would typically preclude any type of content regula-
tion on advertising. A state, despite the heightened analysis, though, may
still enact content-neutral regulations aimed at placing reasonable restric-
tions on the time, place, and/or manner of such restrictions.
The Court distinguished content-neutral and content-based review in
United States v. O'Brien; that case elicited the general rule that content-
neutral regulations on speech may be justified "if [they] further[] an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
91. The Court stated in Fox that "'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values,' and is subject to 'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression."' Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
92. There is however historical support for the protection of commercial speech. See
Amici Curiae Brief for the Newspaper Association of America, 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (No. 94-1140).
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tial to the furtherance of that interest."93 This test was later restated in
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n to allow regula-
tions "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
[which] leave open ample alternative channels of communication."'
Thus, legislatures have some ability to restrict speech generally, but
restrictions targeted specifically at commercial speech would fail under
strict scrutiny. Note that by applying strict scrutiny, the distinctions made
between commercial and noncommercial speech in Metromedia95 would
become content-based distinctions; since the lower scrutiny under Central
Hudson would not be available to the Court, the outcome in Metromedia
would change, and the Court would strike down the San Diego ordinances
in total. Restrictions aimed at curbing truthful advertising would necessar-
ily have to apply to a broader range of products than a state would desire,
however, to comply with content-neutral scrutiny.
The result of the ascension of commercial speech would be disap-
pointing to lawmakers. Because truthful advertising would receive the
same protection as core political speech, any content-neutral regulations
targeted at various product advertising would also have to apply to other
speech to avoid a content-based characterization. Perhaps the advertising,
even if truthful, of harmful products about which states worry could be
classified as inherently misleading, and could thus avoid the application of
strict scrutiny. Whether evidence supports this classification, and what
protection the Court should then give this type of truthful advertising, re-
main to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in 44 Liquormart failed to resolve many questions, its
effect on the broadcast medium being just one. The Court will have to
reach an answer soon because this issue will not go away. Twenty-six
years ago, in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, a district court panel
found that a statutory ban against all cigarette advertising was valid, and
the Court affirmed without opinion.6 Since that time, no cigarette adver-
tising has appeared on television. Similarly, until recently, the hard liquor
industry had a voluntary ban on television advertising which had been in
place since 1948."7 Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. placed a commercial
93. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
94. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
95. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
96. Capital Brdcst. Co., 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affid without opinion sub
nom. Capital Brdcst. Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
97. Facing Declining Sales, Liquor Industry Drops Ban, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE
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for its product last June on a Corpus Christi, Texas television station
breaking the ban,98 which coincidentally corresponds to the month after the
Court announced its opinion in 44 Liquormart.
Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has made public statements con-
demning the liquor industry's actions and vowing intervention by either
the FCC or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) if the networks begin to
accept such advertising.99 Further, Representative Joseph Kennedy (D-
Mass.) introduced a bill explicitly providing the FCC with such advisory
and regulatory powers.'00 The act would create an antitrust exception to
broadcasters, allowing them to voluntarily ban alcohol advertising targeted
at minors."' An advisory committee would target such advertising, and if
the broadcasters failed to act, the Act empowers the FCC to regulate. 10
The FCC is required to ensure broadcasting in the public interest'
This interest, however, is balanced by the First Amendment. In FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, the FCC limited radio broadcast of a George Carlin
comedy bit to the evening, in order to prevent harm to children.'O° Analyz-
ing the restriction of "indecent speech" under intermediate scrutiny, the
Court allowed the regulation, but stressed "the narrowness of [its] hold-
ing."'' 5 Considering the more intense intermediate scrutiny given in 44
Liquormart, it is doubtful whether the FCC may regulate alcohol advertis-
ing without sound evidence of defined relationships between advertising
and product consumption.
The Court historically has had difficulty analyzing commercial
speech. Since the middle of this century, protection for commercial speech
has improved from none to some level of intermediate scrutiny. The im-
portance of advertising has seemingly improved in the minds of the Jus-
tices, while the Court has begun to more carefully consider the state's mo-
tivation for regulation. However, the road the Court has taken most
recently, since the adoption of Central Hudson, fails to consider consis-
tently these opposing forces. In one instance, the Court embraces the state-
WK., Nov. 18, 1996, at 2.
98. Id.
99. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Speech Delivered to the Children's Action Network
Los Angeles (Nov. 19, 1996) (as prepared for delivery), available in 1996 FCC LEXIS
6382.
100. Alcohol Advertising Standards Bill Is Introduced by Rep. Kennedy, WASH.
BEVERAGE INSIGHT, Apr. 25, 1997, at 1 (discussing H.R. 1292, the Voluntary Alcohol Ad-
vertising Standards for Children Act).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994).
104. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
105. Id. at 750.
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sponsored paternalism; it sees through it and discards it in the next. Only
by adopting an absolute, less-manipulable test can the Court avoid the pit-
falls of its own creation.
As our society becomes more sophisticated, the reasons for distin-
guishing between commercial and noncommercial speech disappear. At
least concerning truthful advertising, there is no reason to believe that the
legislature may better receive and analyze such information than any citi-
zen. Unfortunately, under Central Hudson, the state may do just that. It is
most frustrating and disturbing to realize that the Court could have ele-
vated itself above the Central Hudson uncertainty, but did not. If the Court
were to apply strict scrutiny to advertising, the issue would be resolved in
a majority of cases. Until then, the Court will struggle, remaining on the
Central Hudson line.

